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REPORT 
Number 17--April 1974 
At->R.Ad~,_.. 
James J. Lopach, Visiting Assistant Professor, 
Department of Political Science, 
University of Montana 
U6RAR1 
Introduction 
Sources and Expectations 
of Utility Regulation 
Utility regulation in Montana has perennially occupied 
center stage in Montana politics. The Montana Public 
Service Commission has been a persistent subject of 
heated controversy concerning the quality of protection 
it has given the consuming public. This situation has not 
been unique, because state regulatory commissions gen-
erally have not enjoyed good reputation with students of 
public affairs. The Montana Public Service Commission 
is characteristic, therefore, in that it has few defenders 
and many critics. The common view in Montana- the 
opinion of a newspaper editor, a law professor, an attor-
ney, a legislator, a housewife, a former utility employee 
- is that the Montana Public Service Commission is in the 
"back pocket" of the state's largest utilities. Public atti-
tude toward utility regulation is important when adequacy 
of energy sources is being widely debated. The Commis-
sion soon will be asked again to make significant decisions 
concerning utility rates and practices. How should its 
regulatory decisions be received? This article attempts 
to provide information that will help answer this ques-
tion.* 
In 1913 the Montana Legislative Assembly created 
the Public Service Commission to protect the consumer 
by supervising, controlling, and regulating public utilities 
in the public interest. This move was a concession by the 
legislature that effective regulation demanded detailed 
knowledge and continuing attention that the legislature 
itself had not been able to provide. The commission was 
*The Report is based upon the author's Ph.D. dissertation in Political 
Science, The Montana Public Service Commission: A Study in Admin-
istrative Decision-Making, University of Notre Dame, 1973. 
thought to have certain strengths that would enable it to 
carry out its mandate. It should provide flexibility and 
expert knowledge in the state's attempts to maintain a 
fair balance between rates and service under constantly 
changing circumstances. 
For many reasons, in Montana as elsewhere, this regula-
tory design has been less effective than was expected. 
State regulatory commissions were endowed by legis-
latures with broad discretionary power. Vaguely stated 
formal requirements to determine rates in the "public 
interest" gave the commissions great potential control 
over the activities of utilities. The utilities responded by 
increasing their political vigilance and activity. At the 
same time, the regulatory commissions were hampered by 
a role conflict between administrative functions and 
judicial functions lodged in the same body. To the degree 
that the administrative or investigative characteristic 
came to be deemphasized, the commissions became pas-
sive agencies increasingly dependent upon expert and 
informed presentations by the regulated company. 
Marver Berstein has provided an interesting interpre-
tation of the apparent failure of these regulatory bodies 
in the United States. [Bernstein, Regulating Business by 
Independent Commission (1955) 74-102.] His cyclical 
theory traced evolution of a regulatory body through 
consecutive stages of crusading reform, identification 
with the goals of a specific industry's management, and 
finally institutional senility taking refuge in the status 
quo which it had fostered. There were many reasons for 
this decline, but Berstein stressed the overwhelming 
superiority of the regulated industry in its tecbnical 
knowledge and the ignorance of the general public about 
regulatory matters. Public ignorance meant indifference 
and lack of support for vigorous regulation. Lacking 
support for vigorous activity, the regulatory commission 
eventually closed ranks with its only defender, the regu-
lated indust~y. to become, in time, the protector of the 
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industry. Thus Bernstein generalized American exper-
ience with regulatory commissions. 
Commentaries on the status of governmental regula-
tion of business usually refer to the final stage of this 
cycle. In 1951 Harold Ickes asked: 
[W]ho today believes that the public interest is served by these 
State commissions? In the course of time the private utilities 
muscled their way in by the usual methods with the result that 
the commissions, in effect, became adjuncts . . . of the private 
utilities. [Gellhorn and Byse, Administrative Law (4th ed., 
1960) 39.] 
Paul MacAvoy attributes distortion of the intent ofregula-
tory commissions to the greater expertise of the regulated 
industry: "In the end, rates are fixed which reflect no 
other reality than that of compromise, reinforced partly 
by the superior advantage of the utilities in litigation." 
[MacAvoy, The Crisis of the Regulatory Commissions 
( 1970) 11.] Grant McConnell echoes the conclusions of 
Bernstein: "The outstanding political fact about the inde-
pendent regulatory commissions is that they have in gen-
eral become the promoters and protectors of the industries 
they have been established to regulate." [McConnell, 
Private Power and American Democracy (1966) 287.] 
The most severe criticism of attempts at regulation, 
however, is not the failure effectively to regulate but the 
concern that interest group domination of the regulatory 
process has poisoned the entire political system. McCon-
nell has said that comprehensive efforts of a regulated 
industry to achieve a favorable regulatory climate result 
in "corruption in the political process itself." [Ibid., 32] 
Paul Douglas noted a corrupting backlash to state regu-
lation: 
With the coming of state regulation of electricity, gas and tele-
phone rates, these private utilities then reached out increasingly 
to control the state governments and to regulate their supposed 
regulators. Every student and practitioner of politics knows how 
these private utilities have been among the most corrupting 
forces in state politics during the last 30 years. [Gellhorn and 
Byse, Administrative Law (4th ed., 1960) 42.] 
Charges of regulatory failure, interest group domina-
tion, and impairment of the political system have been 
voiced in Montana politics for years. Upon his election to 
the Montana Public Service Commission in 1935, Jerry J . 
O'Connell said: 
Too long have the consumers of Montana paid the cost of 
election activities of the power trust here; too long have they 
paid the cost of the lobbying activities of these companies seek-
ing every special privilege they can obtain; too long have the 
consumers paid for the wine, the women, and the. whisky which 
changes legislative minds at every assembly since Montana was 
admitted to the Union; too long has the consumer's money been 
used to place the burden of taxation upon them and relieve the 
profit-mad plunderers of Montana. [The Western Progressive, 
January 4, 1935.] 
In 1954 Attorney General Arnold Olsen charged the Pub-
lic Service Commission with refusal to resist utility and 
railroad rate increase requests: "It is painfully evident 
the consumers of Montana are not going to be protected 
by their Railroad and Public Service Commission!' 
[Great Falls Tribune, March 15, 1954.] In 1967 Senator 
Lee Metcalf said the Montana Power Company was 
behind a "drive for economic and political domination" 
of Montana. [Great Falls Tribune, August 20, 1967.] 
In the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention, Missoula 
delegate George Heliker, a professor of economics, 
stated: 
[O]ne needs no special expertise in the esoteric realms of that 
ritualistic enterprise lau-ghingly referred to as 'regulation' of 
public utilities to know that it is one of the great scandals of 
American state government in the twentieth century. Anyone 
even faintly acquainted with the facts knows that, in all but a 
handful of states, the corporations who were to have been 
regulated in the consumer's interest have long since become 
the regulators-regulating regulatory commissions, regulating 
legislatures, regulating courts, regulating opinion, and regu-
lating elections. ["Statement of George B. Heliker to the 
Montana Constitutional Convention Public Health, Welfare, 
Labor, and Industry Committee, February 5, 1972" (Helena, 
1972) 1-2.] 
Thus, criticism of the regulatory process in Montana, 
as elsewhere, often rests on a perceived invasion of a 
public or governmental function by a private, narrowly 
defined interest. The organized private interest is de-
picted as usurper to the degree that it weakens the public 
institution's advocacy of the public interest. The fact that 
a public interest exists to be defined through substantive 
policies cannot easily be dismissed. Imprecision of avail-
able criteria admits a wide range of possible resolutions, 
and the size of the financial interests involved insures 
that conflicting approaches will be articulated. 
The writer believes that a public interest can be iden-
tified in utility regulation, and that it must balance the 
rate-payer's burden and the economic soundness of the 
utility-service to the consumer and profit to the investor. 
How ever the balance is struck, the definition of the public 
interest will always be subject to pressure from all parties 
to the bargain for a redefininition more favorable to 
their particular interest. Accordingly, private utilities 
are not pirates because they are profit oriented. Their 
tactics to achieve favorable regulatory policies need not 
be regarded as sinister. Because the conditions on which 
regulatory decisions are based change, and because all 
parties will continually seek adjustments in the existing 
regulatory scheme, the public interest can never be im-
mutably identified. Thus, discussion of the public interest 
might more profitably focus on the regulatory system's 
procedural aspect, on its operating relationships and its 
rules, rather than on the outcome of the process. The 
public interest has broad and enduring significance when 
it is defined in terms of the openness and fairness and 
thoroughness of the process that ultimately leads to the 
regulatory decision. In concrete terms, this means that 
the regulatory process could be functionally open and 
not merely formally open; all parties to the hearing 
would have equal access to competent professional repre-
sentation, to complete and reliable information, and 
adequate time to prepare arguments. It means that the 
commissioners would accompany their decision with a 
clear, well-reasoned written opinion. Such formulation 
of the public interest could give added meaning to a 
discussion of the adequacy of utility regulation in Mon-
tana. 
The Montana Public Service 
Commission: 
An Unfulfilled Promise 
The task the Montana Public Service Commission was 
established to accomplish has never been in doubt. In 
1923 the commission clearly expressed its mandates. 
Prior to its establishment: 
[E]very rate to a consumer of a product of a public utility in 
Montana rested on private contract between the consumer and 
the utility. Some of these rates were unjust, unreasonable, dis-
criminatory, and unduly preferential. To put a stop to practices 
of that character, to improve the service rendered by public 
utilities, to cause to be fixed just, reasonable, and equitable rates 
for the service rendered, and to equalize the burden between 
consumers, manifestly were objects within the legislative in-
tention. [State ex rel Rankin, Attorney General v. Helena 
light and Railway Company, 1924 Public Utilities Reports, 
Series B, 13.] 
But the obstacles in the way of the commission soon 
became obvious. Adequate material support and neces-
sary powers and guidelines never were provided by the 
Montana legislature. 
In 1967 the authorized expenditure level of the Montana 
commission was the lowest of the public service commis-
sions in eleven western states; only five states (Alaska, 
Delaware, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont) 
had budget levels below Montana. [This and following 
comparative data are derived from United States Senate 
Committee on Governmental Operations, "State Utility 
Commissions," (Washington, 1967).] In the same year 
only .five states (Alaska, Delaware, Rhode Island, Utah, 
and Vermont) had a smaller utility commission staff than 
Montana's fifteen persons, and only the Utah commission 
had fewer staff positions than Montana among the eleven 
western states. These eleven western states, listed in 
descending order of commission staff size, were Califor-
nia, Oregon, Washington, Arizona, Colorado, New Mexi-
co, Nevada, Idaho, Wyoming, Montana, and Utah. Salaries 
of full-time state regulatory commissioners ranged from 
$10,000 to $29,160 throughout the United States in 1967. 
New York paid the highest amount, while Montana along 
with Nebraska, North Dakota, Rhode Island and Utah paid 
the lowest salary. 
The three Montana commissioners along with their 
single rate analyst have the task continuously to audit 
the books of each utility company under their jurisdic-
tion; the power to initiate rate investigations; and the 
duty to prescribe fair rates of return for the utility com-
panies. The regulatory burden on the Public Service 
Commission can be appreciated by comparing the size of 
its 1970-1971 appropriation to the number and worth of 
the utilities it was responsible for regulating. The three 
commissioners with their 20-man staff and a budget of 
$237,916 had the job of regulating over 600 transportation 
carriers and about 200 public utilities. The total plant 
valuation of these utilities regulated in 1970-1971 was 
set by the commission at $689,073,000 and the total gross 
revenue of these companies was put at $169,880,000. 
Although rate determination is the most publicized 
task of the Public Service Commission, it is only part of 
the commission's overall job of supervision. The commis-
sion also is to determine if the companies have sufficient 
facilities to promote the safety, convenience, and inter-
ests of the rate payers, the general public, and the utility's 
employees. The commission is authorized to establish and 
supervise a uniform system of accounts for the reporting 
requirements of the utilities; it must approve their issu-
ance of securities and bonds; the commission can initiate 
rate investigations, authorize the abandonment of ser-
vices, and watch for discrimination in services. Despite 
this scope of responsibility the Montana Public Service 
Commission does not possess many powers that other 
state commissions exercise, especially those powers that 
closely regulate the internal business operation of the 
utility. For example, 18 state utility commissions regu-
late exports of electricity; 16 authorize hydroelectric 
development; 37 prohibit a utility from acquiring another 
type of utility; 47 regulate the sale, merger and purchase 
of facilities; 22 regulate declaration of dividends; 35 can 
regulate the reorganization of a utility; 20 require advance 
submission of a utility's budget; and 15 require competi-
tive bidding on property additions. The Montana Public 
Service Commission possesses none of these powers. 
Despite the volume of work the Public Service Com-
mission handles and the potential impact of its decisions 
on the average citizen of the state, the agency possesses 
a low level of public visibility. A 1972 surv~y conducted 
by the writer found that of 234 pehons contacted in Great 
Falls, Missoula and Helena, 87 percent were unable to 
name any incumbent member of the Montana Public 
Service Commission. The persons contacted were almost 
equally ignorant of the duties of the commission. Seventy-
five percent of those contacted could not state a commis-
sion function, other than to rephrase the question in terms 
of the commission "protecting the public" or "serving 
the public." It thus appears that vigorous utility regula-
tion should not look to public backing for the source of 
its strength. 
It is clear that the Montana Public Service Commission 
occupies a difficult political position. The job laid out for 
it by statute is imposing. With its limited resources and a 
ridiculously small public utilities department, the commis-
sion presents · a David and Goliath image as it sets out to 
regulate a major part of the state's corporate wealth and 
managerial talent. Yet under the present system of select-
ing members of the commission, an electorate that is not 
alert and knowledgeable concerning matters of utility 
regulation picks commissioners to make decisions that 
greatly affect the economic life of the state. Because of 
the great responsibility and the intense policy conflict at 
the heart of public utility regulation, the commissioner 
selection process should be able to recruit persons with 
relevant training, abilities and interests. A scrutiny of 
the background and qualifications of Public Service Com-
miss10ners in Montana reveals another source of 
commission weakness. 
The original design for utility regulation anticipated 
that commissioners would have either a pertinent profes-
sional background or the demonstrated capacity and 
determination to acquire the necessary expertise. For 
example, a background in law, accounting, engineering, 
economics, or marketing is consistent with the demands 
of the job. In addition to such professional requirements, 
and probably mote important, the commissioner should 
be keenly aware of the conflicting claims to his allegiance 
and able clearly to determine his role amid these tensions. 
His mark of excellence is his ability to demonstrate that 
his judgment is reasoned and independent. Montana Pub-
lic Service Commissioners, with very few exceptions, 
have come to the position without impressive credentials. 
The modest salary level of the office, the position's low 
public visibility, failure of the political parties to interest 
persons in the office, and the solicitous concern of the 
regulated utilities in the commission all may have affected 
the qualifications of the commission's membership through-
out the years. 
Since 1913 when the Board of Railroad Commissioners 
began regulating public utilities in Montana, there have 
been twenty-two commissioners. Unusual career patterns 
have developed on the commission primarily because it 
comprises three six-year staggered terms. The commis-
sion has been a career merry-go-round for six commis-
sioners who, unseated in one election, regained a position 
in a few years. Lengthy but interrupted careers have been 
strung together by some men. Others have served on the 
commission for long consecutive periods. Seven commis-
sioners (Boyle, Dennis, Young, Casey, Middleton, Smith, 
and Boedecker) have accounted for 126 of 180 service 
years on the commission since 1913. 
But longevity of commissioners in service does not in 
itself guarantee the expert, professional, and independent 
regulation that the Montana Legislative Assembly and 
the state courts long ago concluded they could not provide. 
Political parties and the popular election process were 
relied upon to insure that men who spent many years on 
the Public Service Commission were competent in their 
office. Yet most commiss\oners appear to have emerged 
from backgrounds completely extraneous to utility regula-
tion; a few men came from jobs in industries subject to 
regulation by the commission. Thus at least six men had 
prior work experience with railroads, and one had owned 
and operated an intrastate bus line. The pre-commission 
positions in these instances were not of sufficient man-
agerial responsibility to serve as professional training 
grounds for the commission, and thus they would hardly 
provide sound basis for a conflict of interest charge. 
Montana has witnessed none of the free flow of high-
level talent between commissions and regulated industries 
often seen at the federal level. Of the remaining com-
missioners, two had a background in farming and ranch-
ing, and three had been active in real estate. The only 
other occupation appearing with some frequency in the 
commissioners' background is insurance, which was the 
pre-commission business of four men. The work back-
grounds of the remaining commissioners included: sales-
man, newspaper editor, student, radio station operator, 
laborer, and personal aide to the governor. Nothing in 
this litany of pre-commission experiences suggests that 
the commissioners were well-versed in the problems, 
tools, and intricacies of utility regulation by way of prior 
jobs. 
Montana commissioners have not notably been pre-
pared for their duties by their education. Education 
would seem to have a role to play in the preparation of 
a commissioner, either in lieu of suitable pre-commission 
work experience or complementary to such experience 
or interests. In the United States, law has represented 
the primary educational background of regulatory com-
missioners. It is clear, however, that professional train-
ing in accounting, economics, engineering or marketing 
would all be relevant to the job of commissioner. The edu-
cational background of nine of the twenty-two commis-
sioners could not be determined, but career patterns indi-
cate that they had not had formal academic preparation in 
fields normally thought to be related to public utility 
regulation. Three of these nine men had worked for rail-
roads, one as a passenger conductor, one as a passenger 
agent, and the other as a fireman; one man had been a 
farmer, one a realtor, one a radio station operator, and 
the remaining three men spent most of their pre-commis-
sion work life in elective county positions and as low-
level state employees. One commissioner completed eight 
years of school and six commissioners terminated their 
formal education after high school. Six commissioners 
attended college. While it may be presumptuous to specify 
a proper educational background for the job of utility 
regulation, only Jerry O'Connell, through his legal educa-
tion, seems to have had some positive preparation that in 
context could be called professional education. 
Name recognition has played an important role in 
electing Public Service Commissioners in Montana. 
Some commissioners established their names politically 
before they were on the commission by holding or running 
for lower state offices or county positions. Other commis-
sioners, as has been observed, have served on the commis-
sion for many years, and the longest of these careers were 
not made up of consecutive terms. Other men, such as 
Boedecker and Holmes, traded on the political value of 
their fathers' names and political careers. The frequency 
and persistency of familiar names on the ballot gave the 
voter an easy solution in voting for an obscure office. 
Through the years such commissioners came to possess 
a most proprietary relationship to their office. 
Weakness of the Public Service Commission can be 
seen in its performance as well as in its resources and 
membership. The commission's interpretation of its 
statutory responsibility to protect the public interest 
can be inferred from an analysis of its decisions over the 
years. Between 1915 and 1972 the Montana Public Ser-
vice Commission decided 264 utility cases for which 
written formal opinions and orders were reported. Study 
of these cases suggests that the Montana Public Service 
Commission demonstrated an overall preference for 
utility interests in general compared to consumer interests 
between 1915 and 1972. There were twenty-one separate 
compositions of commission membership during these 
57 years. Ten three-member clusters sat during the first 
twenty-eight years of the commission, and eleven com-
prised the second period of the agency. Bernstein's 
theory of comrmss10n life cycles with declining regula-
tory vigor appears to characterize the Montana exper-
ience. The ten commissions between 1915 and 1942 
decided 54 percent of their cases for the utilities, while 
the commissions after 1942 decided 91 percent of their 
cases in favor of the companies. 
The Montana Political System: 
Graveyard of Regulatory Reform 
The Montana Public Service Commission decides 
matters of utility regulation and sets forth regulatory 
orders. These decisions are not simply the product of 
three commissioners and their staff. No single factor can 
sufficiently account for the nature of utility regulation 
in Montana. Persistent willingness in Montana to attribute 
regulatory decisions favoring large utilities to bribes and 
p~yo~fs is legendary but grossly superficial and probably 
rmsdirected. The thrust, content, and limitations of rate 
decisions have more probably been determined by other 
elements of the Montana political system. Political parties 
have traditionally commented on utility regulation, to 
influence the policy agenda for the legislature. The 
commission is a creature of the legislature; its structure 
and powers are products of legislative action or non-action. 
And the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention had an 
unique opportunity to rewrite completely the ground 
rules of utility regulation. 
Major political parties in Montana, like those else-
where in the United States, have had two important 
functions. They have attempted to bring diverse groups 
together in support of their candidates, and they have 
advocated certain policies and philosophies of govern-
ment. The platforms of the Montana Democratic and 
Republican parties reveal vivid contrasts in formal posi-
tions on utility regulation; these positions suggest the 
respective orientations of their leadership structures. 
These contrasts have been especially significant since 
the mid l 950's when the pressure of ·monetary inflation 
heated up Montana regulatory politics. Populist strains 
in the state Democratic Party have given the state a 
base for reform sentiments. From 1956 through 1970, 
the Democrats repeatedly called for major reforms in 
the regulation of privately owned utilities. The Demo-
cratic platform of 1956 was typical of that party's views 
on regulation during those years: 
We urge that the Legislature provide the Public Service 
Commission with . . . independent, competent and qualified 
rate experts and engineers .. . to make proper recommendation 
to the Commission in all future rate cases, and that it require 
of_ all rate applicants specific and complete evidence of its oper-
atmg costs, taxes, and cost of capital invested . .. . 
We urge the creation of the office of Public Defender to 
assure the people that their interests are protected in this 
state, where utility interests are so powerful. 
The staggered 6-year term of Public Service Commissioners 
tends to make this board insensitive to public opinion and 
public interest. We urge the Legislature to make a study of the 
situation with a view of making the board more responsive to 
the public interest. 
We urge the Legislature [to] review and study the method 
by which the rate base of public utilities is determined, and 
protect the public against excessive rates. 
We view with pride the accomplishments resulting from the 
REA partnership between farmer cooperatives, public power 
districts and the Federal Government. .. . 
Meanwhile Republican platforms were silent concerning 
utility regulation or called for an end to the special income 
tax advantages that cooperatives enjoyed. The 1962 Repub-
lican platform denounced claims of the Bureau of Recla-
mation to parts of the Missouri River as attempts to "des-
troy individual enterprise and drastically limit area develop-
ment," opposed the federal government's Knowles Dam 
on the ground it would destroy "the tax base of several 
counties," and urged that cooperatives be made to "assume 
their fair share of the cost of government." Given the 
predictably partisan overtones of these platforms, they 
did inject goals for regulatory reform into the state's 
public arena. 
All paths to change of the Montana regulatory situation 
lead to the Montana Legislative Assembly. The platforms 
of the Democratic Party have consistently recognized 
this fact, but in the end the campaign recommendations 
have proved to be futile. A Missoulian editorial (Decem-
ber 4, 1967) said: "If Montanans wish to remove this 
debate forever, ... the public, via the legislature, has 
full power to straighten things out." The Montana Su-
preme Court has repeatedly identified the state legisla-
ture as the real battleground for regulatory reform. In 
1921 the court said: 
It is well-settled law that rate-making is purely a legislative 
act ... . The legislature itself has the undoubted authority to 
regulate public utilities, and by means of a duly constituted 
commission it operates through its administrative medium. 
[Billings Utility Company v. Public Service Commission, 62 
Mont. 21 , 33 (1921)] 
In 1970 the court said: 
I~ is a basic rule of law that the Commission, as an administra-
tive agency, has only those powers specifically conferred upon 
it by the legislature and in determining those statutory powers, 
this Court must give effect to every word, phrase, clause, or 
sentence therein . .. . [City of Polson v. Public Service Com-
mission of Montana, 155 Mont. 464, 469 (1970)] 
To understand why the Public Service Commission has 
behaved as it has, and to understand the fundamental 
constraints on that body, it is necessary to examine the 
fate of regulatory reform proposals in the legislature. 
The Public Service Commission was established in 
1913 as an ex officio arm of the Montana Board of Rail-
road Commissioners. From that time through the 1971 
Legislative Assembly, 90 reform measures of various 
sorts were introduced and only ten of these bills ulti-
mately became · 1aw. Democrats sponsored 38 percent of 
the total and thus had no corner on claims to regulatory 
reform. Democratic sponsorship was scattered throughout 
t~e thirty sessions, while 17 of 26 Republican-sponsored 
bills appeared between 1913 and 1933. In recent sessions 
reformers in both parties have joined forces to sponsor 
measures for change. Eleven of nineteen jointly sponsored 
bills were introduced from 1967 to 1971 . While the Demo-
cratic Party has been solely responsible for less than 50 
percent of the regulatory reform bills, its advocacy has 
been more consistent and insistent, and in recent years it 
has noticeably been the more outspoken voice of reform. 
Although the measures introduced in the Montana 
legislature to change the operating status of utilities 
have been far-ranging, some specific reforms have been 
pushed repeatedly over many years. For example, the 
legislature was asked on seven occasions to investigate 
operations of the Public Service Commission. There were 
seven legislative proposals to change the name of the 
Montana Board of Railroad Commissioners, usually to 
something like the "Montana Public Service Commission," 
and eleven attempts to abolish the commission. Recur-
rence of such proposals emphasizes the defeat or quiet 
death of most of these bills. Of the ten bills enacted after 
the 1913 statute established the commission, four were 
passed in the l 97 l legislature and six of the ten since 
1961, indicating that strength of reform views in the state 
legislature is recent. Three of ten bills that became law 
were special appropriation measures; two authorized the 
Legislative Council to study the Public Service Commis-
sion; an administrative procedure act and an executive 
reorganization bill that made the "Public Service Com-
mission" the head of a Department of Public Service 
Regulation also were enacted. The only bona fide piece 
of reform legislation enacted before 1961 was a 1937 bill 
that authorized the Public Service Commission to ear-
mark and impound the difference between old and new 
rates pending final determination in a rate case. In 1961, 
after two failures in past years, the commission was 
given the power to regulate and supervise the issuance 
of securities by Montana public utilities. In 1971, a 
territorial integrity bill was passed that would protect 
one electric company's service area from invasion by 
another. 
The most significant evidence of the legislative rela-
tionship to the Public Service Commission is found in 
the 79 bills that were killed. As the parent of the regula-
tory body, the legislature repeatedly stifled the commis-
sion's growth and ability to innovate. It engulfed and 
buried the regulatory reform attempts of a singular crusad-
ing Public Service Commission in 1935, of scattered pro-
gressive Democrats over the years, and of a recent coalition 
of reform-minded Democrats and Republicans. The fate 
of these bills reflects the fact that operations of the Public 
Service Commission long have been an intense political 
issue, yet no strategy and organization have developed an 
adequate reform vehicle. A commission that "might have 
been" always existed in the minds of the reformyrs, but 
counter-forces in the legislature always prevented its 
realization. 
Some of the reform bills were radical and all demon-
strated a common assumption of the weakness of the 
commission. Bills to give the commission a name that 
more clearly identified for the public and voters its 
public utility regulation task often gave way to bills to 
abolish the commission outright, or to dismantle and 
replace it with something different. On four occasions it 
was proposed that the duties of the commission be trans-
ferred to the Board of Equalization; in various sessions 
it was suggested that cities and towns should regulate 
utilities, or that a new commission of other state officials 
such as the auditor, agriculture commissioner, and state 
engineer, or the governor, secretary of state and auditor, 
should have these regulatory duties. 
Most bills, however, proposed to attack major ills of 
the commission rather than destroy it. The selection 
process for commissioners and staff were often addressed. 
Three bills would have had the Governor appoint the 
commissioners, and one of these proposals called for a 
single appointed public utility commissioner. Three bills 
aimed to correct weaknesses in the staff of the commis-
sion. The most radical staffing proposal was a 1971 bill 
to create a utility consumer's counsel in the Attorney 
General's office to represent consumers in rate cases. 
This bill amounted to assertion by its sponsors that the 
Public Service Commission was unable properly to carry 
out its dual role to protect the consuming public while 
serving as an impartial quasi-judical agency. Seven 
bills recognized that there was an information problem 
for the commission in its attempts to reach decisions 
from limited and unilaterally prepared data; these pro-
posals sought to strengthen the reporting requirements 
of the public utilities to the Public Service Commission. 
A bill concerning evidence in commission proceedings 
would have placed the burden of proof in rate cases on 
the utility petitioning for an increase. Another bill would 
have required the public utility to pay the cost of a man-
dated valuation investigation by the commission, and 
seven bills went still further, caUing for changes in the 
valuation criteria for rate-making that would better 
protect the consumer. 
The largest category of reform bills, those to increase 
the regulatory power of the commission, exhibited a 
certain optimism about the basic regulatory approach. 
Fifteen of these 22 bills were prepared in 1935 at the 
request of Commissioners Jerry J. O'Connell and Thomas 
Carey who found sympathetic sponsors in the legislature. 
This aggressive legislative advocacy by commissioners 
was unique in the history of the relationship between the 
commission and the legislature. The Western Progressive 
reported on February 15, 1935, that the Public Service 
Commission "presented to the legislature its legislative 
program designed to end domination of political activi-
ties in this state by the Montana Power Company and 
affiliated corporations." The 1935 bills empowered the 
Public Service Commission to investigate all contracts of 
public utilities with other parties, to supervise the budget 
process of public utilities, to reduce rates of any company 
making an excessive profit on its capital investment, and 
to review and revise downward prior writeups in value 
of utility property. 
Some reformers hoped that the Montana Constitutional 
Convention of 1972 could circumvent persistent unwill-
ingness of the legislature to alter the status quo in utility 
regulation. George Heliker, Missoula delegate and pro-
fessor of economics at the University of Montana, spon-
sored a proposal to: - establish a single commissioner 
appointed by the governor; fix the commissioner's role 
as defender of consumer interests; free the commissioner 
from judicial control and the fair value standard; and 
authorize the legislature to set up public power distribu-
tion agencies free from the commissioner's control. 
Heliker believed that future legislative reform attempts 
would repeat the past, so that constitutional reform was 
in order. 
Privately owned utilities, both large and small, strongly 
opposed Heliker's proposal. Their testimony made it 
clear that they preferred the existing regulatory situation. 
Any change in the state's method of regulating utilities 
would result in new relationships, new procedures, and 
possibly new policies. Heliker's plan embodied the hope 
that the desired regulatory realignment would achieve 
tougher regulation. The strategy of the reform advocates 
was opposed by the utilities and rejected by a majority 
of the Public Health, Welfare, Labor, and Industry Com-
mittee. The committee majority said that the matter 
should be left to the legislature, that it was too experi-
mental to be taken seriously, and that they had received 
little evidence that the present regulatory system was not 
satisfactory. The delegates rejected use of the new state 
constitution to achieve what their legislative cousins had 
failed to accomplish in utility regulation. Failing to view 
utility regulation as a fundamental and enduring govern-
mental concern, the Constitutional Convention left reform 
to another day. 
So it has happened that Montana regulatory policies 
have been the products of a web of relationships within 
the state's political system. Reform policies have not 
lacked advocates. Such measures have repeatedly been 
articulated in inconsequential party platforms, in minor-
ity reports of legislative committees, and in a minority 
proposal of the Constitutional Convention. Legislative 
and convention majorities rejected reform, and funda-
mental weaknesses of the Public Service Commission 
have been left untouched. There has been no effective 
vehicle for regulatory reform in Montana politics. 
Conclusion 
A Call for Uncommon Leadership 
The Montana Public Service Commission was estab-
lished to regulate the public utility industry in the public 
interest. Fair and open procedures for utility regulation 
should guarantee that adequate service is available to all 
consumers without discrimination at the lowest reason-
able rates. It is expected that rates take into account the 
reasonable needs of both the consuming public and the 
utilities. Yet more often than not the commission has 
appeared to place the needs of the utility companies 
before the needs of utility consumers. As we have seen, 
this policy orientation is the product of a complex set of 
factors whose net result has been to keep the commission 
weak and passive as a public agency. 
The commission has been repeatedly criticized for fail-
ing to defend the public interest. Farm groups, coopera-
tives and the ideological left, traditionally harbored in 
the Montana Democratic Party, have taken the position 
that the public sector should allocate the state's material 
resources; they would accomplish through government 
what they have been unable to achieve privately. These 
reformers believe that change in commission procedures 
will place them in a better position to influence policies 
because the regulatory system at present is relatively 
closed to their influence. 
A second critical perspective is more basic, recogniz-
ing that utility regulation must accomplish a compromise 
between public ownership and unchecked private mono-
poly. The political environment of utility regulation in 
Montana has raised the possibility that government regu-
lation of utilities could ruin a privately owned business. 
The statutory definition of regulation has fostered both 
politicization and an undiluted private business, "free-
enterprise" posture in the state's privately owned utility 
industry. The Montana legislature has declared certain 
kinds of utilities to be "public," but the intent of the word 
and the means to secure this intent through the operation 
of the commission have never been established. This 
failure to define the conditions for making utilities truly 
"public" has allowed them to remain essentially "private" 
and unregulated. In response to these ambiguities the 
utility industry has become what no vehicle of reform in 
Montana has ever been: organized, cohesive, disciplined 
and policy-minded. The commission has been "priva-
tized" because channels to it have been kept narrow and 
exclusive. Thus the commission accepts the utilities' 
definition of the public interest, that is, what they think to 
be best for Montana concerning utilities. The commis-
sioners hear systematic presentation of the public interest 
only as the utilities see it because no other body, public 
or private, possesses comparable information, resources 
and organization. In consequence regulatory politics in 
Montana reacts against established policies and attempts 
to alter both the power alignment in the state and the 
dominant political philosophy that maintains these pol-
1c1es. 
Much discussion of utility regulation in Montana has 
expressed clashes between competing public and private 
utility interests and their allies. The primary question how 
to make the utility industry serve the public has not re-
ceived adequate discussion. Because publicly owned 
utilities and cooperatives possess political and economic 
legitimacy as do privately-owned utilities, the "public 
interest" must be defined through the political process in 
which different interests can be expressed at different 
times. The "public" cannot be permanently identified 
with any fixed or given set of absolute values or altruistic 
principles. Nor can the public interest be identified only 
by the size of utility bills or the rate of return on the 
utility's investment. By over-simplifying the idea of the 
public interest, opponents of the privately- owned utilities 
and of the existing regulatory situation have made utility 
regulation common currency of Montana politics. Such 
narrow delineation of a valid political issue-the adequacy 
of utility regulation-has mortgaged the state's political 
system to suspicion and cynicism and to inordinate infil-
tration of the public processes by a regulated private 
business. 
The Montana regulatory situation will always be a 
product of relationships as complex as those comprising 
the status quo. A new balance of these tensions in the 
Montana political system must be realized before a differ-
ent definition of the public interest can begin to evolve. 
No simple yet effective program for change seems pos-
sible, but necessary conditions for a strong and indepen-
dent comm1ss10n can be identified. The public interest in 
the area of utility regulation must be defined in proce-
dural terms. The system of utility regulation in Montana 
must be put on a fair and balanced basis to secure the 
political health of the state. A reform of the regulatory 
system must rest upon a generally held belief that the rate 
structure, at whatever level it is set, is the product of 
exhaustive investigation reflecting the judgment of re-
spected and self-respecting professionals. 
Initially it is the unfulfilled duty of the Montana Legis-
lature clearly to define the "public" character of the 
privately owned utilities. This will amount to an authori-
tative classification of the permitted and prohibited, the 
regulated and unregulated activities of privately owned 
utilities. These statements of legislative policy will in-
crease the burden of the commission but give it height-
ened prestige. Recognition of the importance of the com-
mission's charge should be accompanied by provision of 
adequate resources and sufficient staff expertise. In the 
absence of such legislative action to create commission 
independence that has been markedly absent in Montana, 
regulatory politics will remain the province of half truths 
and worn-out debate. 
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Commensurate with its increased duties the commis-
sion should become an expert administrative agency akin 
to an administrative court. The Governor should appoint 
highly-paid persons of unquestionable professional 
stature to serve as commissioners. It is also indispensable 
that the separate office of consumer counsel be carefully 
staffed and adequately funded to handle the duties of 
consumer advocacy, because the commission has not 
been able to carry out effectively both its deciding and its 
investigative duties. Professional commissioners would 
accompany their decisions with reasoned opinions telling 
why a case was so decided. Principles of rate-making 
would be structured into the clash of the contending par-
ties, and the decision-making process would occur in a 
climate of seeking and experimenting among openly 
articulated public values. 
It is difficult to see how measures less than these will 
dispel the heavy cynicism that surrounds Montana poli-
tics. A supportive change in public attitudes probably will 
support courageous though uncharacteristic legislative 
initiatives. Such steps will open up the regulatory system 
and they may diminish the string of compromises that 
has been its history. 
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